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SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS  




The purpose of this MBA Project was to investigate and provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the supporting requirements for the V-22 Osprey from the perspective of the 
United States Navy and Marine Corps. The primary objective was to assist in determining 
the specifics that will be necessary to support the successful fielding of the weapons 
system.  Various analysis techniques help identify and document specific requirements 
including training; spares and contracting options that will be necessary to support the 
overall weapons system from “tip to tail”. Also included in this report are potential 
outliers or issue related to the current plan. The benefit of choosing a commercial support 
plan in the form of Performance Based Logistics versus a traditional government 
supportability plan is measured in readiness. Impacts to cost over the lifecycle of the 
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A failure of an aircraft system, required during the ground airborne phases of a mission 
that precludes the aircraft from completing its scheduled mission.  
 
Aircraft Availability 
The percent of possessed time that a system is capable of performing at least one of its 
assigned missions. 
 
Cost Per Unit Usage 
The total operating costs divided by the appropriate unit of measurement for a given 
weapon system. The measurement unit could be flight hour, steaming hour, launch, mile 
driven, etc.  
 
Depot Purchased Equipment Maintenance (DPEM) 
Refers to programs consisting of depot level maintenance services purchased from 
contract, inter-service, and organic repair sources. 
 
Director of Operations (DO) 
Inputs as to what usefulness/effectiveness a PMC aircraft has in an operational unit. The 
full systems list (FSL), basic systems list (BSL), and mission essential systems list 






DMAG is the purchasing agent, and uses funds provided by DMAG customers. DMAG 
also refers to the process by which budgetary information about these maintenance 
services is exchanged between the DMAG customers who need them and the ALCs who 
supply them.  
 
Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
A base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend 
command and control or communications, or to provide support for training and tactical 
operations.  
 
Forward Operating Locations (FOL) 
A temporary base of operations for small groups of personnel established near or within 
the Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) to support training of indigenous personnel or 
tactical operations.  
 
Full Operational Capability (FOC) 
The full attainment of the capability to effectively employ a weapon, item of equipment, 
or system of approved specific characteristics, which is manned and operated by a 
trained, equipped, and supported military unit or force.  
 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 
The first attainment of the capability to effectively employ a weapon, item of equipment, 
or system of approved specific characteristics, which is manned or operated by an 





The government/contractor size or “presence” of logistics support required to deploy, 
sustain, and move a weapon system. Measurable elements include inventory/equipment, 
personnel, facilities, transportation assets, and real estate. 
  
Logistics Response Time 
This is the period of time from logistics demand signal sent to satisfaction of that 
logistics demand. “Logistics Demand” refers to systems, components, or resources, 
including labor, required for weapon system logistics support.  
 
Mean Flight Hour Between Abort (MFHBA) 
The total number of flight hours divided by the total number of aborts.  
 
Mean Flight Hour Between Critical Failure (MFHBCF) 
MFHBCF measures the average flight hours between failure of mission essential 
systems/functions, as referenced in the MESL, which renders the aircraft Non-Mission 
Capable (NMC). MFHBCF is computed by the number of flight hours divided by the 
number of code three landings and aborts.  
 
Mean Flight Hours Between Failure-Logistics (MFHBFLog). 
The ability of the system to operate under operational and support concepts, utilizing 
planned logistics resources (manpower and spares). This metric is calculated by the total 
flight hours flown divided by the total number of all failures. The purpose of this metric 






The Mission Capable (MC) rate is the sum of the Full Mission Capable (FMC) and 
Partial Mission Capable (PMC) rates. Rates are reported via the status reporting system 
outlined in service specific guidance.  
 
Mission Capable (MC) Rate 
The percent of possessed time that a system is capable of performing at least one of its 
assigned missions. Rates are reported via the status reporting system outlined in service 
specific guidance. Mission Capable (MC) Rate will be based on number of hours the 
aircraft is in a mission capable status, divided by total hours possessed. The MC rate is 
the sum of the Full Mission Capable and Partial Mission Capable (PMC) rates. Rates are 
reported via the status reporting system outlined in AFI 21-103.  
 
Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP) 
An MRSP is an air-transportable package of spares, repair parts, and related maintenance 
supplies required to sustain a weapons system for a specified period of planned wartime 
or contingency operations.  
 
Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP) Fill Rate 
The minimum level that any individual CV-22 MRSP kit is allowed to reach.  
 
Non-Mission Capable 





Not Mission Capable Supply 
The aircraft cannot do any assigned missions because of supply. The aircraft cannot fly 
(restricted from use), or a part(s) that needs to be installed on the aircraft in order to meet 
assigned missions.  
 
Operational Availability 
The percent of time that a weapon system is available for a mission, or the ability to 
sustain operations tempo.  
 
Operational Reliability 
The measure of a weapon system in meeting mission success objectives (percent of 
objectives met, by weapon system). Depending on the weapon system, a mission 
objective would be a sortie, tour, launch, destination reached, capability, etc.  
 
Partial Mission Capable (PMC) Rate 
PMC rate defines the maximum amount of the MC rate which can be met with PMC 
aircraft. The PMC percentage is based on the AFSOC. 
 
Stockage Effectiveness 
A customer support measurement identifying a supply account’s ability to satisfy a 
customer demand with items the supply system is authorized to stock (based on Air Force 
Stockage Policy).  
 
Total Not Mission Capable Supply (TNMCS) Rate 
This monthly/annual metric is the average percentage of possessed aircraft that are unable 
to meet primary missions for supply reasons.  
 
  xxii
Urgency Justification Code 1A 
The aerospace vehicle cannot fly any of its assigned missions due to lack of parts for 
subsystems on the MAJCOMs basic lists.  
 
Urgency Justification Code JA 
The aerospace vehicle can fly at least one of its assigned missions based on a basic 
systems list, but not all missions due to lack of parts for systems on other mission 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Osprey is one of the latest and most complex joint weapons systems ever 
developed by the United States military. At the beginning of this paper it was in the Low 
Rate Initial Production phase, however just prior to completing the manuscript it was 
awarded approval to enter the full rate production phase.  Chapter II not only walks 
through inception and refinement of the V-22, but in a detailed technical overview, it 
compares and highlights many of the Osprey’s key system advantages over those of the 
traditional helicopter.   It also notes some of the risk involved in fielding such high-tech, 
complex weapons systems.   
Chapter III introduces the current plan for training pilots and maintainers.  It 
offers an outline of the requirements and format for the training facilities. It also includes 
some of the concerns in the current training regiment that may require extra effort to 
resolve. One situation involves the inability to rotate the nacelles while the aircraft is 
inside the maintenance hangar.  Another key concern is not just training, but also meeting 
the need to train the aircraft maintenance crew to support the variations in Osprey 
configurations.  
Chapter III also gives an overview of the operational capabilities of the Osprey, 
and its capabilities when working with the U.S. Marine Corps, or Navy.  In some 
instances the capabilities of the V-22 act as force multipliers by fulfilling tasks that are 
traditionally performed by other aircraft. Osprey often performs the additional tasks 
better, and successfully “free-up” fighter aircraft for other missions.   
Chapter IV introduces the various contract options, and why the new performance 
based logistics contract is the contract of choice compared to the traditionally support 
method. It also includes an analysis of various alternatives and supporting arguments for 
the final choice. Chapter V introduces an overview for parts support and gives a basic 
introduction to the logic that led to the final decisions. Chapter VI is the conclusion, but it 
also notes other opportunities for research.   
  2
The Osprey has been in development for over 20 years, but the need for emerging 
technology supported its successful realization.  The original intent in this manuscript 
was to use more numerical analysis, however the complexity of the project’s funding 
eroded the option for using a purely numerical analysis method. The Osprey has simply 
raised the bar for technology. It was designed and fielded to meet the needs of the next 
generation war-fighter. Its technology has drawn a new line in the sand for performance 
standards and made history in aviation. This paper gives only a brief glimpse of her 









As 1991 brought about the end of the Cold War, the latest focus of the U. S. 
military is now the global war on terrorism.  This war has rapidly progressed since 
September 11, 2001 (with the Bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and 
the attack at the Pentagon in Washington DC). This tragedy unveiled a new enemy of 
democracy and freedom whose efforts have inevitably changed the face of warfare 
around the world. Small and agile, this new enemy is capable of making its presence 
known to all countries, anytime, and almost anywhere.  This enemy cannot be identified 
as a single sovereign or regime because it is a transformational and faceless ideology that 
has successfully harnessed and used one of the greatest weapons and single weaknesses 
of any powerful nation, and that weapon is the weakness of human nature.  
In the wake of this new threat, the U.S. Military has been forced to undergo 
significant transformation. This effort includes the ongoing need to develop highly 
sophisticated weapons systems.  The current presidential administration has led the way 
by supporting many new innovations including network-centric warfare, the F-22 Joint 
Strike Fighter, and the Osprey’s tilt-rotor technology. All have made major advancements 
by successfully combining opposing capabilities. 
The Osprey’s tilt-rotor capability was a controversial technology that made its 
military debut in the late 80’s. After having both a rocky research and development and 
low rate initial production phase, the V-22 received its approval for full-rate production. 
The approval of the Osprey and its tilt-rotor capability, like other major programs, has 
simultaneously created the requirement of joint military logistics, maintenance, and 
training support. 
The goal of this report is to offer a comprehensive review of the military’s overall 
plan for program supportability. This report reviews various aspects of supportability 
requirements, maps the options for execution, and addresses any potential outliers that 
may hinder the success of fielding, support, and personnel training requirements. The  
  4
methodologies used for analysis include a cost-benefit analysis of the readiness capability 
of civilian versus military support, and a cost analysis of the training requirements and 
infrastructure that may be needed after fielding.  
A. TECHNICAL 
Taking off and landing vertically a tremendous tactical utility that is considered as 
an indispensable military asset in modern warfare. However, low airspeed and altitude, 
which significantly adds to its vulnerability is considered a key drawback.1 Ceiling 
constraints and general performance in inclement weather is also an important limitation 
of the helicopter when compared to its fixed-wing counterpart. The helicopter’s tail rotor, 
especially on a single rotor helicopter, is a marked drain on engine power, and increases 
aircraft drag and noise. It is also considered as an ever present hazard to general 
operations.2 
The dramatic increase in the U.S. military’s operational tempo has led many to 
believe that the military helicopter reached its practical capabilities limit in warfare 
decades ago.3 The next generation of aircraft has to successfully eliminate all of the 
helicopter’s capability limitations, while incorporating the performance advantages of a 
fixed wing aircraft. Combining the better of two separate technologies has been the 
strategy for a variety of U.S. military weapons systems. The tilt rotor was introduced and 
designed to fulfill this requirement. 
The concept of creating an aircraft with tilting propellers was conceived early in 
the history of manned flight. Later the concept of refining the technology was pursued 
shortly after the advent of helicopter. A significant amount of world wide research 
yielded a variety of concepts for tilt-rotor technology. In the end, many prototypes 
reached construction, but very few ever successfully took flight.  A key issue in 
developing such sophisticated technology was that many engineering challenges required 
decades of research, technology maturation and evolution. Prior to actual technical 
                                                 




realization and what could be considered a practical vehicle prototype, engineers built a 
few experimental aircraft specifically for data collection.4 
The first true tilt rotor aircraft that actually was capable of flying was built by the 
Transcendental Aircraft Corporation with a small amount funding from the Department 
of Defense.  The tiny aircraft only had a maximum hover gross weight (GW) of just 1750 
lbs and a wingspan of 21 ft.  The rotors were powered by a single reciprocating engine 
located within the fuselage. The prototype’s first hover flight occurred on 15 June 1954. 
It made its first partial transition five months later and eventually flew with about 70 
degrees of actual rotor tilt. After this prototype made over 100 flights and flew 23 flight 
hours, the aircraft crashed on June 20, 1955.5  
Despite the unfortunate end of the original prototype, almost 30 years later the V-
22 Osprey eventually began its research and development phase.  Although it has taken 
20 years to get it to the low rate initial production phase, the delays in program execution 
cannot completely be attributed to limitations in research or technical capability. 
Numerous key external issues such as budget cuts, changes in presidential 
administrations, and military strategic transformation have all had a heavy impact in 
program development. World events such as the end of the Cold War and China’s 
economic boom supported the procurement “holiday” that demanded the drastic 
downsizing in national defense assets and the defense commercial industry. The U.S. 
military’s current technology lag has become a critical deficiency in the global war on 
terrorism. The current need for balance between transformation and the joint service 
mandate for new weapons systems negatively impacts operational readiness at all levels 
of the military. 
The heavy influence and current mission requirements was a key driver in the 
contrast between the V-22 and her and her predecessors. The tilt-rotor has successfully 
combined prop-rotor and engines together in a single rotating wingtip nacelle. The object  
                                                 
4 B. Norton,. Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey, (2004), North Branch, MN: Specialty Press. 
5 Ibid.  
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of this design scheme was to allow the aircraft to take off like a helicopter with the 
nacelles at 90 degrees. After take-off, the nacelles rotate forward from 90 to 0 degrees for 
conversion into a high-speed airplane.6   
Conversion begins at a speed where the wings are simultaneously gaining lift as 
the rotor lift decreases with tilt angle.7  During its minimal time in transition, the “prop-
rotor blade and hub serve as a dual use helicopter blade and airplane propellers.”8 The 
counter-rotating prop-rotors located on either side of the aircraft’s fuselage naturally 
cancel the opposing rotor torque. This effectively eliminates the requirement for a 
traditional helicopter tail rotor. However, this change does have some impact on hover 
capability, but the impact is considered an acceptable trade-off considering the added 
advantage of cruise speed and distance. Despite the fact that the Osprey has a lower 
cruising speed than that of an airplane of comparable power and weight, it far exceeds the 
cruising speed of a helicopter. This was a key performance element in the development of 
the weapons system primarily because Osprey was specifically designed to replace the 
helicopter, not the airplane.9   
The controls in the cockpit serve common functions regardless of the 
mode of flight. When the Osprey is in hover mode and low speed flight 
with the nacelles tilted near vertical, the collective or thrust control lever, 
and cyclic or ‘stick’ provide familiar helicopter functions. The prop-rotors 
employ helicopter control mechanizations. A lateral cyclic for roll and 
translation or sideway flight commands changes in the prop-rotor blade 
pitch angles that simultaneously come around during rotation. This 
produces a sideways tilting of the rotor disks. Due to the asymmetrical 
prop-rotor lift differential collective pitch is uniform but opposed to blade 
angle changes on each prop-rotor or differential lift. Pitch control from 
longitudinal cyclic displacement gives fore and aft tilting of the rotor 
disks.10  
As the aircraft accelerates through a high speed conversion, the physical controls 
of the Osprey change functions. This change requires the pilot’s control strategy to 
                                                 
6 B. Norton,. Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey, (2004), North Branch, MN: Specialty Press. 





progressively adjust until it eventually resembles that of a conventional fixed-wing 
aircraft. In airplane mode (APLN) the rudder pedals produce yaw while the stick 
becomes a climb, dive and roll rate controller by moving the ailerons, flaperons and 
elevator. The thrust control lever (TCL) input provides power for a simple throttle to set 
the longitudinal thrust. The longitudinal stick is used to manage the aircraft energy state 
by relatively increasing or decreasing the flight path angle, constant speed or by allowing 
the aircraft to accelerate and decelerate.  
Ground testing played a vital role in verifying design choices and optimizing 
system requirements. The program successfully overcame a variety of engineering 
challenges and problems specifically related to the systems. As with any new 
development as the program progressed it had many high and low points. Often, 
experimental technology needs time for science to catch up with the requirements. This is 
always an easy accomplishment especially in lieu of the ongoing challenges and 
complexity of major defense programs.11  
The following graph, Figure 1, is a comparison of the Osprey flight capabilities 
compared to that of the helicopter and the fixed wing aircraft. Note the area where 
Osprey has successfully captured the best of both technologies.  
  
 
• Navy V-22 Performance    
– Tilt-rotor design 
– VTOL 
– Speed/Range/Ceiling of Turboprop 
– Nominal Cruise 240Kts 
– Mission Radius 350nm 
– Service Ceiling 25,000ft 
– Normal Altitude w/pax 10,000ft 
– Ferry Range 2100nm w/ 1 refuel 
 
Figure 1.   Flight Capabilities Comparison12 
                                                 
11 B. Norton,. Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey, (2004), North Branch, MN: Specialty Press. 
12 A. Easterly, V-22 Business Development Bell Helicopter Textron. “Navy V-22 Concept 
Employment Brief, Naval Postgraduate School, January 20, 2004”. 
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Power plant  
 
  • Two Allison T406-AD-400 engines  
  • Max and Intermediate,  SHP(kW) - 
6,150 (4,586)  
Rotor System  
  • Blades per hub - 3  
  • Construction - graphite/fiberglass  
  • Tip speed, fps (mps) - 661.90 (201.75)  
  • Diameter, ft (m) - 38.00 (11.58)  
  • Blade area, ft2 (m2) - 261.52 (24.30)  
  • Disc area, ft2, (m2) - 2,268.00 (210.70) 
  • Blade folding - automatic, powered  
Transmissions  
  • Takeoff [USMC], ship (kW) - 4,570 
(3,408)  
  • Takeoff [USN], ship (kW) - 4,970 
(3,706)  
  • Takeoff [USAF], ship (kW) - 4,970 
(3,706)  




  • Max speed, SL, Kits (km/h) - 275 (510) 
  • Vert rate of climb, SL, fpm (m/m)  
      1,090 (332)  
  • Max rate of climb, SL, fpm (m/m)  
      2,320 (707)  
Range  
  • Amphib assault, nm (km) - 515 (954)  
  • Max, self-deployment, nm (km)  
      2,100 (3,892)  
Crew  
  9
  • Service ceiling, ft (m) - 26,000 (7,925)  
  • Service ceiling, one engine inop, ft (m) 
      11,300 (3,444)  
  • HOGE, ft (m) - 14,200 (4,328)  
  • Cockpit - crew seats - 2  
  • Cabin - troop seats/litters - 24/12  
Dimensions - Internal  
  • Length, max, ft (m) - 24.17 (7.37)  
  • Width, max, ft (m) - 5.92 (1.80)  
  • Height, max, ft (m) - 6.00 (1.83)  
 
Weights  
  • Empty, lbs (kg) - 33,140 (15,032)  
  • Takeoff, vertical, max, lbs - 47,500 
(21,546)  
  • Takeoff, short running, max, lbs (kg)  
      55,000 (24,948)  
  • Takeoff, self-deploy mission, lbs (kg)  
      60,500 (27,443)  
  • Cargo hook, single, lbs (kg)  
      10,000 (4,536)  
  • Cargo hook, dual, lbs (kg) - 15,000 
(9,221)  
Dimensions - External  
  • Length, fuselage, ft (m) - 57.33 (17.48)  
  • Width, rotors turning, ft (m) - 83.33 
(25.55)  
  • Length, stowed, ft (m) - 62.58 (19.08)  
  • Width, stowed, ft (m) - 18.42 (5.61)  
  • Width, horizontal stabilizer, ft (m) - 18.42 
(5.61)  
  • Height, nacelles fully vertical, ft (m) - 
21.76 (6.63)  
  • Height, vertical stabilizer, ft (m) - 17.65 
(5.38)  
Fuel Capacity  
  • Sponsons, gals (liters) - 1,228 (4,649)  
  • Wings, gals (liters) - 787 (2,979)  
  • Aux, self-deployment, gals (liters) - 2,436 
(9,221)  
 
Figure 2.   Osprey Characteristics13 
 
B. OPERATIONS  
In support of the latest joint requirement, the Osprey has a configuration that is 
slated to meet the operational requirements for all military services. It is especially 
                                                 
13 CV-22 Osprey, “Overview of the Osprey’s and its Role in the Future of the U.S. Special 
Operations”. Retrieved on July 26, 2005 from https://wwwmil.seymourjohnson.af.mil/tenant/360trs/cv-
22%20Osprey.htm. 
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designed to support to the Navy’s transformational shipboard operational requirement. 
Osprey offers such supporting features as a 90 second rapid wing and blade fold, 
corrosion resistance and a system that supports resistance to electromagnetic interference. 
This was a key issue during production because of shipboard space constraints and the 
significant number of electronic systems onboard U.S. ships. Additionally, navy ships 
typically have weight limitations and launch speed requirements that are key drivers in 
the success of a many evolutions. This would be vital in the ship’s ability to perform 
search and rescue operations at sea.14 
The Navy’s current plan is to certify the Osprey for operation onboard all classes 
of U.S Navy amphibious ships and aircraft carriers. Any Logistic ships that are capable of 
launching and recovering the CH-53E Sea Stallion should also receive full certification 
for the Osprey. Additionally, this aircraft should have a better fore and aft rotor 
obstruction clearance than that of the traditional MH-60. Certification for navy ships will 
still be required prior to commencing operations using the Osprey, but Osprey should 
offer increased flexibility and support for operational readiness.  
The Osprey offers numerous improvements over her predecessors that support 
emerging requirements of sea operations. One advantage is that in airplane mode it has a 
reduced acoustic signature as well as infrared engine suppressors. Osprey also has the 
advantages of an increase in speed/range and an advanced threat warning systems that 
has a reduced susceptibility to synergistic manner. Engineers chose to use composites in 
the prop-rotor and airframe in order to provide a certain level of ballistic tolerance that 
allows the Osprey to continue flight after sustaining impacts from projectiles up to and 
including a 23mm Armor Piercing Incendiary(API) round.15  
Cockpit seats are armored to withstand 7.62mm small arms rounds and the 
aircraft fuel tanks are self-sealing and contain nitrogen gas to reduce the 
possibility of vapor ignition after they have taken a hit. Engineers noted 
that nitrogen has a lower flash point than oxygen therefore it reduces the 
                                                 
14 Proprietary Source 1, December 2003. 
15 Proprietary Source 1, December 2003 p. 2-4. 
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possibility of explosions.  Additionally, the flight control system has triple 
redundancy and both the hydraulic and electrical systems have dual 
redundancy.16 
The Osprey was designed to support any future requirements or needs of the 
military. It has also been designed with a focus on the requirements outlined in the 
Defense Planning Guidance and Sea Power 21. Sea Power 21 is the lead document for the 
Navy’s transformation. Its strategy is based on the three fundamental concepts defined as 
Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. FORCE-net integrates all three concepts and is 
hailed as the backbone for successful execution. FORCEnet unites the warrior, sensors, 
networks, control, platforms and weapons into a network distributed combat force.17 The 
Osprey’s versatility and various configurations are the key design elements that support 
the successful execution of service specific and congressional strategies. 
Osprey’s range, speed, payload, and basing options are critical to achieving the 
objectives specified by Sea Power 21.  First, there has to be an increase in the logistics 
capability for the Expeditionary Strike Force to sustain a sea-based striking force. Inter-
theater transfers of mission-critical equipment, personnel, and supplies are continuous 
critical capabilities that have to be met prior to and during hostilities. As a key player in 
sustaining logistics support, the Osprey fulfills a variety of requirements including tanker 
refueling, search and rescue missions, and high-speed troop transport.18  
The Osprey’s diverse capabilities increase the overall effectiveness and 
operational readiness of any carrier or Expeditionary Strike Group by acting as a force 
multiplier. The V-22 tanker configuration has 10,000 lbs of “give-way” fuel for a full 
cycle. This is a 67% increase in capability when compared to the existing S-3 refueling 
aircraft that only has a fuel capacity of 6,000 pounds. Operationally, Osprey’s refueling 
capability translates into four strike fighters individually, which gains an additional 20 
minutes of flight time. This also presents a significantly greater safety margin than the 
one that is currently available with the S-3 tanker. The Osprey’s tanker configuration also 
                                                 
16 Proprietary Source 1, December 2003 p. 2-4. 
17 Ibid. 
18 A. Easterly, V-22 Business Development Bell Helicopter Textron. “ Navy V-22 Concept 
Employment Brief, Naval Postgraduate School, January 20, 2004”. 
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acts as a “force-multiplier by giving the Carrier Air Group (CAG) the option of uploading 
F/A- 18 Hornets with additional ordinance to support the force mission versus the old 
requirement that typically included the use of Hornets for tankers.”19  
The diagrams Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the strategic location and make-up of 













                                                 
19 A. Easterly, V-22 Business Development Bell Helicopter Textron. “ Navy V-22 Concept 
Employment Brief, Naval Postgraduate School, January 20, 2004”. 
20 Ibid. 



















Figure 4.   Osprey Fuel System, Part 221 
 
The Navy’s Sea Power objective is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   Navy’s Sea Power Objective22 
                                                 
21 A. Easterly, V-22 Business Development Bell Helicopter Textron. “ Navy V-22 Concept 
Employment Brief, Naval Postgraduate School, January 20, 2004”. 
22 Proprietary Source 2, September 2004. 
• Navy V-22 Aerial Refueling 
–  Auxiliary Tanks: 2 x 430 gal (5590 lbs.) 
–  Internal Fuel: 11,700 lb/1720 gal 
–  Fuel Giveaway: Auxiliary + Internal 
 (17,290 lbs.)  
–  Kit Weight: 660 lbs 
–  Fuel rate: 120gpm 
–  Reconfigure time: < 1.5 hours 
–  V-22, CH-53E, AV-8, F/A-18, JSF, etc. 
–  230kts 
–  80-91 ft hose length 
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C. MISSION/OBJECTIVE 
The V-22 is being developed to perform for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, 
and the U.S. Special Operations Command combat mission.  Its highest priority is the 
U.S. Marine Corps aviation because of the critical requirement to replace the CH-46E, 
which is used by the Marine Corps, Navy and the Special Operations forces in hostile 
areas. The acquisition of this medium-lift aircraft represents a revolutionary leap in the 
ability of U.S. forces from over the horizon to inland objectives.  It flies twice as fast, 
significantly further, and with a heavier payload which is often key to the successful 
execution of maneuver warfare. In essence, successfully capitalizing on this capability 
greatly enhances the survivability of the war-fighters. 
The Air Force Special Operations Forces and U.S Special Operations 
Command missions are the most stringent missions of the V-22 because of 
the potential anticipated extended exposure to high threat environments.  
The CV-22 variant for special operations will travel five hundred nautical 
miles while flying 500 feet above ground level, locate a small landing 
zone, infiltrate and ex-filtrate a team of 18 special operations ground 
forces and return to base. The capability for these operations must extend 
at least as far as being done covertly, at night and in adverse weather. The 
CV-22 special operations configuration will have an enhanced 
survivability by virtue of the electronic warfare suite specifically designed 
to meet the Special Operations mission as well as meeting the 
survivability standards identified for the basic V-22 weapons system.23  
The Osprey is also slated to meet a variety of joint requirements with a diversity 
that is unmatched by any other military or civilian aircraft. It has been designed for in-
flight refueling as well as search and rescue at sea, and can successfully insert and extract 
troops during amphibious operations. It has been tested for a variety of uses that meet the 
ever-changing needs for covert special operation and joint operability among the services. 
The design of the Osprey surpasses the helicopters in range, speed, and payload capacity.  
It has been built as a response to the changing needs of the future military, and is a key 
element in the success of future global military operations.  
                                                 
23 CV-22 Osprey, “Overview of the Osprey’s and its Role in the Future of the U.S. Special 
Operations”. Retrieved on July 26,2005 from https://wwwmil.seymourjohnson.af.mil/tenant/360trs/cv-
22%20Osprey.htm 
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Several world regions provide breeding 
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III. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
A. PILOTS 
The cornerstone in the efforts to field the Osprey is laying the groundwork for a 
successful training program. This may seem difficult considering that weapons systems 
require the skills of both fixed and rotor pilots. In January 1999, the U.S. Marine Corps 
Aviation Department issued an order to “organize, train and equip MV-22 forces in an 
effort to support the fielding phase of the Osprey. The results included the development 
of a five phase course of action that was designed to “train the trainer.”25 Lee and Dell in 
their thesis titled Planning Flight Training for the Transition to the V-22 Osprey, which 
specifically talks about the development of the Osprey training program, noted that the 
transition began with determining the optimum location that would provide the best 
opportunity for implementing a joint training plan.26 Additionally, this location had to 
have the ability to meet the training requirements for all military services.  
The initial plan included the first phase of training that would be necessary to 
transition Ch-46 and other pilots into the pipeline and that would support full fielding of 
the V-22. The USMC has dedicated a proportional amount of time to incorporating 
lessons learned from previous aircraft transitions and to consolidating lessons learned 
specifically attributed to experience with the Osprey.  
A syllabus was developed for training a Fleet Replacement Squadron 
(FRS). The initial plan was category of training that would ultimately lead 
each student through a progressively more difficult stage of training as he 
advanced through the program. Each stage includes interactive media 
instruction, flight simulators, and actual aircraft flights in the latest 
prototypes.27  
“One key difference in the Osprey when compared to past aircraft training was 
that more emphasis would be placed on simulator training due to the cost of the 
                                                 
25 Proprietary Source 1, December 2003. 
26 Ibid. 
27 R.M. Lee and R.F. Dell, Thesis, Planning Flight Training for the Transition to the V-22 Osprey. 
NPS.  
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aircraft.”28 Certain simulator and actual aircraft flights would have to be flown at night, 
both with and without night vision goggles (NVGs) to support the pilot’s requirement to 
maintain proficiency in flying night operations. Additionally, the early stages of training 
could be considered more regimental, while later the program’s schedule becomes more 
flexible as students approach the later stages of their program.29  
After FRS training, pilots begin tactical training with their perspective fleet units. 
The most advanced training could be conducted by fleet squadron instructors; however 
other training may require specific levels of certification. Some key concerns for the 
transition plan included the potential for the bathtub effect. In essence, this is a situation 
where pilots return from a deployment, transfer for various reasons to other commands, 
and are replaced gradually during the 18-month period between deployments. Typically 
this has been permitted with minimal concern, but considering the demands imposed by a 
shortening of deployment cycles, the V-22 units may experience progressive deficiencies 
that may be difficult to eliminate. Over a short period of time the stability of the unit may 
be gravely affected by this shortfall.30 The increasing requirements of the military may 
escalate the overall effect of this deficiency.   
In June 1999, the Helicopter Squadron (HMT-204) was officially re-designated as 
VMMT-204 with a mission of providing Osprey training for both Marine and Air Force 
pilots as well as maintenance personnel. This training facility is located at Marine Corps 
Air Station in New River, North Carolina.  In April 1999, the squadron received a new 
motion-based operational flight trainer to train instructors to fly the Osprey.  The 
Operational Flight Trainer (OFT) provides the pilot with computer-generated horizontal 
and vertical visual scenes all inside of a 24-foot dome. It also provides a full range of 
motion that gives pilots the “feel” of both acceleration and deceleration. It also presents 
students the opportunity to train in a broad spectrum of simulated environments.31  
                                                 
28 Steve Bernard, NAVAIR, August 2005.   
29 R.M. Lee and R.F. Dell, Thesis, Planning Flight Training for the Transition to the V-22 Osprey. 
NPS p.6-13. 




1. Pilot Training Devices  
The following operator devices have been identified as requirements to support 
the V-22 training facility. Currently, most are being utilized by both the USMC and the 
Air Force Special Forces.  
a. Integrated Cockpit Learning Environment (ICLE) 
The ICLE consists of a full-size replica of the V-22 cockpit, mounted on a 
fixed base, and used to provide instruction on aircraft systems and procedures. The ICLE 
was procured in FY02 and is scheduled for delivery in FY04. 
b. Full Flight Simulator (FFS) 
The FFS is a flight deck replica of the MV-22, representative in 
appearance, flight performance characteristics, and system operation.  The simulator is 
equipped with a six degrees of freedom motion base, tactical/threat environment, and a 
full field of view visual simulation system. MV FSS 1 and 2 were ready for training 
(RFT) in FY01 and FY02. MV FFS 1 and 2 Block A upgrade was completed in FY03. 
MV FFS 3 with Block A will be RFT in FY04. It is planned to procure MV FFS 4 in 
FY05, with RFT in FY07. CV FFS 1 was RFT in FY03. CV FFS 2 is planned for 
procurement in FY05, with RFT in FY07. 
c. Flight Training Device (FTD) 
This is a flight deck that is identical to the FFS, but without the motion 
system. MV FTD 1 was RFT in FY01. FTD 1 Block A upgrade was installed in FY03, 
with the Block B upgrade planned for installation during FY05. It is planned to procure 
13 additional MV FTDs between FY07 and FY15. CV FTD 1 was RFT in FY04. 
d. CV-22 Cabin Part Task Trainer (CPTT) 
The CPTT is a replica of the interior cabin of the CV-22, including cargo-
handling equipment.  One Air Force unique CPTT will be procured for the Flight 
Engineer (FE)/Loadmaster training course.  The device was procured in FY04 for 
delivery in FY06. The CPTT will be located at Kirtland AFB. 
B. MAINTAINERS 
The Marine Corps maintainers will also employ a phased strategy for the 
transition of the Marine Corps medium-lift fleet to the Osprey. Upon transition, each 
squadron will maintain an aircraft inventory of 12 aircraft. The essential time-to-train for 
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a squadron transition is approximately 24-30 months. This period consist of a Stand-
down, Post-Transition, and a Pre-Deployment Training phase. Initial training for fleet 
personnel or maintainers will also be conducted at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) in 
New River, North Carolina. Similar to the pilots training, service and mission unique 
training will be developed to support each service’s unique mission requirements.32  
Marine Medium Tilt-Rotor Training Squadron 204, located at MCAS in New 
River, will be designated the Fleet Readiness Squadron for V-22 aircrew and the Fleet 
Replacement Enlisted Skills Training for maintenance training.33 The current program is 
designed to reduce the hours of maintenance required in conjunction with the military’s 
ongoing effort to decrease the need for support personnel.  
The Manpower Engineering Program (MEP) consist of five sub-programs used in 
planning, programming, and budgeting for manpower resources to support the Navy’s 
operating forces and shore establishments.  The Preliminary Squadron Manning 
Document implemented the program and lists the following subprograms: Shore 
Manpower Document Program, Commercial Activities Program, and Navy Manpower 
Mobilization Systems. Skill levels and the number of personnel needed are being 
determined by various support elements. Documents providing the skill levels and 
personnel numbers include the Joint Training Systems Plan and the prime contractors 
Training & Equipment Plan.  
The Navy planning process is pertinent in documenting new developments. These 
developments include new aviation, equipment, system, subsystems, and non-hardware. 
It also tracks aircraft squadrons transferred to the Naval Reserve, reserve program 
components, area training requirements, and mission continuum.  New weapons systems 
always require a transition period that can be long or short, depending on the previous 
capability. The requirement to man the new weapons system at a similar level as the 
system it replaces always presents a resource constraint that affects all participating 
                                                 
32 R.M. Lee and R.F. Dell, Thesis, Planning Flight Training for the Transition to the V-22 Osprey. 
NPS.  
33 NASA Research Center. Tilt Rotor Aeroacoustic Model. Tilt Rotor Aeroacoustic Model (TRAM) 
as a National Research Facility. Retrieved August 23, 2005 from 
http://rotocraft.arc.nasa.gov/facilities/tram.html 
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services.  Manpower requirements for weapons systems that are not a one for one 
replacement for older systems must be identified and included in the manpower budget. 
Risk involving manning shortfalls must be mitigated to minimize its impact to fielding 
the supportability phase of the program. In this case, the Osprey will replace Marine 
Corps aircraft on a one-for-one basis. 
The Marine Corps has also created a new set of Military Occupational Specialties 
(MOS’s) specifically for the V-22 program.  The training program objectives are 
designed by the contractor with a focus on complimenting and maximizing the skills of 
those new to the MOS. The V-22 Maintenance Training System identifies a 
comprehensive solution for the maintenance training resources necessary for the training. 
Those resources reside at an inter-service schoolhouse located at MCAS in New River. A 
Memorandum of Agreement between HQAET and HQ Marine Corps was put in place to 
set up this training process. The training media and CV-22 unique maintenance training 
devices are a subset of MV-22 resources at the school. The normal sustainment process 
for the Navy and Marine Corps maintenance personnel will be used to maintain training 
resources.34 
Currently, courses and training are underway to support the Osprey’s low rate 
initial production phase. Courses offered include a Crew Chief Initial Skills Course 
which is designed to provide training to members of the U.S. Air Force. It includes basic 
skills and knowledge necessary to perform maintenance on all CV-22 systems. The Crew 
Chief Familiarization Course provides transitional training for maintainers who are 
presently qualified on the H-53 and H-60 helicopters. Personnel chosen to take this 
course are typically level 5 or 7 and will be trained specifically on the differences 
between the old and new weapons system.  Other courses include training that focuses on 
the Avionics Systems Specialist, which is geared toward level 5 and 7 personnel. Among 
other aspects of the training, this course will include an Aircraft and Cockpit 
familiarization section.  
                                                 
34 R.M. Lee and R.F. Dell, Thesis, Planning Flight Training for the Transition to the V-22 Osprey. 
NPS. p. 6-19 
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Graduates will be awarded certification upon completion of the courses. Courses 
that are currently being offered include the CV-22 Crew Chief’s Course, which 
individually are close to 10 weeks in duration; the CV-22 Avionics Systems Course, 
which is a little over nine weeks in duration; and the CV-22 Electro-Environmental 
Systems, which is a transitional course that focuses on electrical systems, environmental 
control systems and wire repair as well as other systems applicable to the CV-22 aircraft. 
This course is also just over nine weeks in duration. The Hydraulic Systems Course and 
the Propulsion Systems Course are both five weeks and similar to the other courses and 
are geared towards a level 5 or 7 technician. 
In essence, the current courses cater to personnel who are transitioning from other 
aircraft and already have a working knowledge of aircraft maintenance. This decision 
bodes well for the future success of the current training programs and the overall fielding 








Figure 7.   Maintenance Man-Hrs/Flt Hour35 
 
C. MAINTAINER TRAINING EQUIPMENT 
The following maintenance trainers have been procured or delivered to the V-22 
joint schoolhouse in New River, NC.  These trainers will support O-level courses 
conducted by the V-22 Maintenance Training Unit. 
                                                 
35 A. Easterly, V-22 Business Development Bell Helicopter Textron. “ Navy V-22 Concept 
Employment Brief, Naval Postgraduate School, January 20, 2004”. 
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Part-Task Trainers (PTT) 
The Part-Task Trainers have been developed based on the LSA data, the IETM, 
and the Instructional Systems Development (ISD) process.  Seven PTTs have been 
delivered to the MTU. 
Landing Gear PTT (LGPTT) 
The Landing Gear PTT consists of two devices and replicates the Landing Gear 
System. It provides O-level maintenance personnel with realistic training in the servicing 
and repair of the landing gear strut, wheel, and brake system.  The LGPTT RFT was 
October 1, 2002.  
Mechanic PTT (MPTT) 
This is a replica of a wing (60%), from just beyond the mid-wing area through the 
nacelle, and it includes gearboxes, drive train, engine, prop-rotor components, and flight 
control surfaces. It provides O-level maintenance personnel with realistic training in the 
servicing and repair of the engine, drive-train, selected flight control systems, and 
associated subsystems. The MPTT RFT was October 1, 2002.  It is currently being 
upgraded to a V-22 Block A configuration and RFT with an intended fielding date of 
February 2005. 
Airframe PTT (AFPTT) 
This is a replica of a wing (60%), from just beyond the mid-wing area through the 
nacelle, and it includes gearboxes, drive-train, engine, prop-rotor components, and flight 
control surfaces.  It provides O-level maintenance personnel with realistic training in the 
servicing and repair of the engine, drive-train, selected flight control systems, and 
associated subsystems. The AFPTT RFT was October 1, 2002.  Upgrade to Block A/B 
configuration is planned to be RFT in April 2006. 
Sponson PTT (SPTT) 
This is a replica of the Left-Hand Sponson and includes the selected 
Environmental Control Unit (ECU) and fuel system components.  It provides O-level  
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maintenance personnel with realistic training in the servicing and repair of selected tasks 
involved with the ECU, fuel system, and subsystems. The SPTT RFT was October 1, 
2002.  
Power Plants Trainer Article (PPTA) 
This trainer is comprised of a full wing with nacelles and engines in a Block A 
configuration.  It provides O-level maintenance personnel with realistic training in the 
servicing and repair of the engine, drive-train, selected flight control systems, and 
associated subsystems.  The PPTA was RFT in September 2003.  
Consolidated V-22 Electronic Maintenance Trainer (CVEMT) 
This trainer will provide USAF O-level maintenance personnel with training 
associated with selected CV-22 unique systems.   The CV-EMT was procured in FY03 
for delivery to the MTU at MCAS in New River during FY04. 
Aircraft Maintenance Trainer (AMT) 
Aircraft Bruno 165433 was re-designated as a training device during the 3rd 
quarter of FY01 and is located at the MTU, which is at MCAS in New River, NC. The 
AMT was upgraded to a Block A configuration, with an RFT date of November 2004. 
The AMT provides O-level maintenance personnel the training necessary to service, 
troubleshoot, repair, or remove and replace the aircraft’s major systems and subsystems. 
Current planning is to acquire two EMD aircraft after completion of flight testing, 
estimated to be during FY06. These aircraft will also be designated as AMTs and will 
support the projected training throughput. The second AMT is planned to be upgrade to 
Block A/B configuration. 
Trainer Fault Insertion System (TFIS) 
TFIS will allow the instructor to insert and remove selected avionic and electrical 
faults into the AMT to enhance and reinforce system troubleshooting training. TFIS will 
be used in conjunction with the AMT. TFIS (LRIP) was RFT in December 2003.  A 
second TFIS in a Block A configuration was scheduled for delivery in December 2004. 
 
  25
Avionics Functional V-22 Trainer (AFVT) 
The AFVT provides realistic training in the operation and troubleshooting of the 
V-22 Cockpit Management System. The AFVT is comprised of four student stations and 
one instructor operator station (IOS). The student stations will replicate the V-22 cockpit, 
utilizing touch screens in place of the actual cockpit controls.  Incorporation of aircraft 
mission computers allow the student stations to be reconfigured to either an MV or CV 
configuration.  The AFVT has been upgraded to a Block A configuration. A Block B 
upgrade is planned to be incorporated during FY05. 
The above systems, in concert with the courseware, comprise the VMTS, which 
will be used by all services. The Enlisted Crew Training is to provide crew members with 
the skills and knowledge necessary to safely and effectively perform pre-flight, post-
flight, turnaround, and daily inspections.  Training will also allow crew members to 
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IV. PARTS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
A. PARTS REQUIREMENTS 
Various elements of the military have worked diligently to determine the future 
requirements of the Osprey. The overwhelming decision to use Performance-Based 
Logistics (PBL) is a decision that has slowly made its way to the forefront of weapons 
system supportability. Considering that each service and Special Operations Command 
will have a modified configuration of the original, it appears that the idea of parts support 
should be as simple as the availability of a sister military service. Also, considering the 
increased amount of redundancy in the system, the Osprey is designed to eliminate 
significant system failures.  
The Performance Based Logistics effort includes awarding a long term 
contract to Bell-Boeing to provide wholesale logistics support with 
effectiveness measured using parameters such as parts availability.  Past 
Boeing PBL contracts have used a combination of incentives to insure that 
contract and readiness requirements were being met. Considering Aircraft 
availability or readiness is directly tied to parts availability, the concept of 
parts availability has several external factors including the effectiveness of 
the supply chain, design reliability, maintainability, and obsolescence of 
parts resources that present notable challenge in supporting readiness.37   
Outliers that are beyond anyone’s control include war-time support and surges in 
demand that are not driven by historical data or foreseeable factors such as increases in 
hostilities. In some of the past PBL contracts, Boeing has successfully accounted for 
small surges in demand.  However, when parts allowances are set and fleet requests 
exceed 200 percent or greater of the initial allowance, it creates a ripple effect in support. 
In essence, the contractor is forced to pull future requirements forward to meet the 
unexpected demand. This typically causes an increase in cost, and in some instances may 
negatively impact the contractor's performance incentive, despite the fact that many 
events are outside the scope of the contract.  
Contrary to popular belief, many defense contractors make notable sacrifices to 
meet the military’s need. This historical government-contractor relationship supports the 
                                                 
37 Proprietary Source 6, Logistics. 
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efforts that are currently being made to improve not only the methodology for 
performance incentive awards for PBL contracts, but to also improve the procedures that 
track awards for performance. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to improve 
its mechanism for forecasting so that unexpected increases in initial allowances can be 
decreased, eliminated, or addressed with the appropriate amount of urgency. An effort is 
also being made to accurately document a surge in requirements and adequately reflect 
that surge as it relates to contractor responsiveness and the relationship of that 
responsiveness to fee and profit.   
 
Figure 8.   V-22 O&S Cost Break Out38 
 
Contractor Responsibilities               
                      
Managing and Conducting a Continuous reliability improvement program   
Managing and conducting A continuous maintainability improvement program 
Managing and conducting a parts/component obsolescence mitigation program 
Control of configuration Changes in support of the initiatives above     
Control of engineering Changes in support of the initiatives above     
Control of technical data changes in support of the initiatives above.     
 
Table 1.   Contractor Responsibilities39 
 
                                                 
38 From Proprietary Source 7, Budget. 
39 Performance Based Logistics. “Contracting and Performance Agreement Management for PBL. 
University of Alabama Center for Science & Technology.  
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B. JUSTIFICATION FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT 
R= Readiness 
FH= Flying Hours 
T= Total System  
The objective of total system support is to maximize flight hours per dollar. Total 
System support is includes all elements of cost both tangible and intangible. In short, how 
long can the V-22 fly, how much is it going to cost, and where is the balance that 
maximizes the equation?  Additionally, is there a greater benefit in dollars per flight hour 
with government total system support versus the benefit in dollars per flight hour for 
commercial industry total system support? A constrained optimization exists between the 
marginal benefit of readiness over the marginal cost of readiness versus the marginal 
benefit of flying hours over the marginal cost of flying hours and the marginal benefit of 
total system support over the total cost of system support. The key constraint or resource 






MBR ==  
MBR=Marginal Benefit of Readiness 
MBC=Marginal Cost of Readiness 
MBFH= Marginal Benefit of Flying Hours  
MCFH= Marginal Cost of Flying Hours 
MBTS= Marginal Benefit of Total System 
MCTS= Marginal Cost of Total System. 
Any increases in readiness are constrained by the budget.  Therefore, it is 
important to determine the maximum amount of readiness in flying hours that can be 
purchased with each fiscal year’s budget.  
Considering DOD has a decreasing budget that is set by Congress, this could be 
viewed as a weighted outlier. The relationship between readiness and Congress can be 
measured by making Congress a factor that is inversely proportional to the budget or cost 
for readiness, yet directly proportional to the demand for readiness measured in flying 
hours.  
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Congress = X 
Demand = D as related to demand for readiness or deployment of troops 
 
MCR
MBR = 1 over the 
MCX









At what point can there be a balance that will increase the number of flying hours 
while simultaneously decreasing the total system cost of life cycle supportability?  The 
marginal benefit of readiness would have to be measured in reference to the number of 
mission-capable (MC) flying hours versus the number of non-mission-capable flying 
hours, or flying hours that were lost due to an aircraft being in the non-mission capable 
(NMC) status.  
Mission capability can be reflected as a direct cost of the additional amount of 
supportability required to reach the mission-capable status. What does it cost to maximize 
the number of mission-capable flying hours and at what point does cost and support reach 
a balance that maximizes readiness without increasing budget requirements and directly 
impacting demand?  
Although there are certain fixed costs that can be considered up front, including 
infrastructure that is in place to support manufacturing facilities, transportation, and 
ongoing technology improvements, there are specific outliers to the program’s flying 
hours that historically vary significantly enough to offset budget goals. Items that include 
ongoing technology improvements, the rising cost of fuel, the increasing cost of qualified 
engineers, and the ongoing global demand for U.S. military support are just some of 
those factors.  
Eliminating extenuating factors leaves the basic equation for readiness defined as 
it was initially. However, it is difficult to mitigate risk related to demand variances. The 
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current plan is to simply contract for support over the lifecycle of the program which 
should meet the ever-changing requirements for a new technology. 










Figure 9.   Quantity of Readiness by Price of Readiness 
 
C. TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT 
Naval Air Depot, North Island intends to use the successful 
implementation of the F/A-18 E/F Integrated Readiness Support Team 
(FIRST) Program as the guide for incorporation of the V-22 VIGIL 
Program. The Performance Based Logistics (PBL) strategy was 
established to target war-fighter performance based goals for weapons 
systems, subsystems and components.40  
                                                 










This strategy ensures that cradle-to-grave or life-cycle support responsibilities are 
assigned for the overall life management of the reliability, supportability, and total 
ownership cost (TOC) of a system.  It also translates to war-fighter specified levels of 
operational performance that are directly related to sustaining the program at a level that 
meets system readiness requirements. Finally, the strategy focuses on reducing long-term 
operating and support costs. 
"Depot North Island is hailed as being the center of excellence for both 
electronic/electrical systems, and all instruments related to those systems. They have the 
technical expertise to help the Osprey program maintain the highest levels of 
readiness."41 The PBL strategy, in conjunction with North Island’s expertise, not only 
encourages contractor innovation via performance incentives, but it also empowers to 
improve system deficiencies that increase system effectiveness. The outlier for the 
successful implementation of performance- based logistics is finding a way to exceed 
requirements while simultaneously reducing life-cycle cost.  Most have determined that 
the most effective way to reduce cost over the life of a weapons system is by using a total 
life-cycle management approach.42  















                                                 
41 Proprietary Source 5, Analysis, p 8-15. 














Figure 10.   Planned Total Ownership Costs43 
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Table 2.   Influence and Control Lists44 
                                                 















Contractor $28.9B  71.3%
GFE          $  3.1B    7.6%
Support     $  4.7B  11.7%
Other         $  1.9B    4.7%
Spares       $  1.9B    4.7%
Production
$40.55B
Mission Personnel        $19.0B    24.9%
Unit Level Cons.           $21.0B    27.4%
Intermediate Maint.       $  7.8B    10.2%
Depot                            $  5.3B     6.9%
Contractor Support        $  3.1B     4.0%
Sustaining Support        $  6.2B     8.1%








PB-06 Budget Submission (Feb 2005) (TY$B) 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB 26 July 2004) (TY$B) 
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D. COMPARISON/CONTRAST 
The Performance-Based Logistics strategy is the chosen mechanism for meeting 
the Osprey’s supportability requirements. However, there are a variety of options for 
executing this strategy. A comparison of the various options for support will help 
determine the optimum or best value for the V-22 sustainment strategy. Several PBL 
options were considered, but the best five options are included in this analysis. The 
analysis took into consideration all elements of logistics/sustainment and only included 
the options that would meet the requirements in the original statement of work. (The 
following is a brief summary of a study that helped determine the most feasible 
alternative for fielding Osprey’s PBL strategy.)  
The first alternative is the option of Status Quo which implies that future 
sustainment will mirror the current operating environment support plan. 
This includes a three-tiered maintenance concept comprised of an 
organizational, intermediate and a depot level of maintenance. The Naval 
Inventory Control Point will function as the program system integrator as 
well as acquire the initial common V-22 spares. They will also provide 
replenishments for spares throughout the life of the program. 
The second alternative is the alternative that utilizes a single long term 
sustainment strategy contractor as the program systems integrator to 
manage all V-22 sustainment requirements.  Initial spares will be acquired 
by Naval Inventory Control Point and supplied to the Program System 
Integrator as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). Organizational 
and intermediate maintenance will be completed by military maintenance 
personnel for their perspective aircraft configurations.   
The third Alternative is a deviation of alternative 2 that includes a 
modified version of the second and utilizes a single long term sustainment 
strategy contractor as the program system integrator to manage all 
sustainment requirements. Initial spares will be acquired by the Navy 
Inventory Control Point and supplied to the PSI as GFE while 
organizational and intermediate maintenance will be completed by the 
respective service specific maintenance personnel. However, all funding 
will utilize the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF). 
Alternative four utilizes the Naval Inventory Control Point as the Program 
System Integrator to manage all V-22 sustainment. This is the typical 
sustainment method chosen by many Navy programs. Military personnel  
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will conduct organizational and intermediate maintenance while the 
wholesale inventory management remains as part of the program system 
integrator’s responsibility. 
Alternative five combines the best attributes of Alternatives three and 
Alternatives four. In analyzing alternative four, the focus is on the 
strengths, weaknesses and risk of a single performance based agreement 
that supports all war fighters. 
Various weights were placed on specifics aspects of program success. 
Deviations between alternatives were quite small, and in some cases 
almost negligible. However, the final determination was that Alternative 
three which was a modified version of alternative two is the option that 
provides optimal support.  Primarily this alternative creates a sustainable 
support structure that provides support to the war-fighter by maximizing 
the government/contractor logistics strength while maintaining 
affordability.   
The program manager retains overall management and responsibility 
however the contractor is responsible for the daily tooth to tail support of 
the weapons system for the operational forces. This includes material 
management, supply chain management, technical data management, 
engineering support, obsolescence management, reliability managements, 
availability management and other support functions as required.  
Additionally, the government has significant experience in awarding and 
executing the performance based logistics service contracts.  Combine this 
effort with financing and sustaining program efforts via the Navy Working 
Capital Fund and results yield a mechanism that support financial a high 
degree of flexibility.  
The NWCF it is a non-appropriated account that does not carry the risk of 
expiring funds. It also enables the contractor to mitigate risk by allowing 
an investment in long-term support at reduced costs. Implementation has 
historically been approximately 20-24 months, but for this analysis, 22 
months is accepted. The organization responsible for this effort should 
have a working knowledge in supply support management and planning 
with an overall objective of satisfying war fighter requirements while 
reducing total ownership cost.45  
The results of this study offer overwhelming support for the current program 
strategy. NAVICP has a long-running history for providing parts support, and has helped 
sustain the Navy and Marine Corps through many ongoing and ever-changing demands.  
                                                 



























The needs of the future joint military have introduced a variety of initiatives that 
are designed to meet the ever-changing requirements. Performance-Based logistics is one 
element whose primary objective is to reduce the life-cycle cost of major weapons 
systems. Its focus is on the integrity of the relationship between the customer and the 
contractor versus a traditional more definitive focus on the details of the contract.  Its 
goal is to offer more autonomy to the contractor for technology insertion while sustaining 
maximum levels of performance.  In the PBL contract, negotiations can be re-opened by 
either party at any time, but typically resolution is sought at much lower levels.  
Contractor profit is driven by performance while oversight is provided by the 
dwindling members of the government’s contracting world. As with many new 
initiatives, a number of questions remain unanswered, but the most pressing question is 
this: will Performance-Based Logistics withstand the change of political power and a 
dwindling budget?  
B. CONTRACTING FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED LOGISTICS 
Performance-Based Logistics is gradually becoming a key element in the 
Department of Defense procurement strategy for major weapons systems. In many cases, 
its popularity as a supportability mechanism is due to its ability to offer a perceived 
balance in risk, technology integration, and cost that benefit both the government and 
contractor. The focus of this particular strategy is quite the contradiction to the prior 
adversarial relationship that existed between the government and its major contractors. 
The key difference is that the success of this strategy is based on the “relationship” versus 
the “contractual agreement” between the two entities. Today’s Integrated Product Teams 
consist of key players for both the government and the contractor. 46 
 
 
                                                 
46 Performance Based Logistics. “Contracting and Performance Agreement Management for PBL. 
University of Alabama Center for Science & Technology.  
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C. THE CONCEPT 
Performance-Based Logistics is defined as an “alternative logistics support 
solution that transfers traditional Department of Defense inventory, supply chain 
management and technical support functions to the supplier for a guaranteed level of 
performance at the same or reduced cost.”47  The intent is to transfer significant decision 
and control aspects of the contract that are traditionally the role of the Department of 
Defense, from the government to the contractor. In essence, “total system support 
responsibility” as well as a perceived equilibrium of risk is shared between the 
government program manager and the contractor program manager.  
Advantages include faster response times for support, less red tape for 
engineering change proposals, and a projected lower overall life-cycle cost. 
Theoretically, the contractor has more authority to use his best judgment regarding 
technology insertion, including the use of newer technology, performance-enhancing 
technology, and other options that may increase performance or decrease the overall life-
cycle cost. The contractor also has the right to make specified engineering changes to a 
weapons system with minimal government oversight. This level of autonomy should 
create efficiencies that improve timelines and contract execution.  
D. PBL STRATEGY PROBLEMS/ISSUES 
Specific problems and issues are addressed in this portion of the analysis. 
Solutions and potential options are included at the end as part of the analysis. 
• Rate of Technology-As with many new initiatives, flaws and oversight are 
prevalent. In the PBL plan, a key concern is the “disconnect” in the expectations between 
key stakeholders in regards to the life of a program. The government often extends the 
life of a weapons system even in circumstances where the overall system is obsolete and 
the life-cycle costs are starting to increase. The necessity of the government’s ongoing 
use of obsolete technology, commercials contractors, and subcontractors typically results 
in unplanned and extremely high startup costs to build or re-design support elements for 
obsolete systems. Contrary to the commercial industry, these issues have not been enough 
                                                 
47 D. Oliver, Performance Based Logistics Program Brief, June 4, 2001. Retrieved August 21, 2005 
from www.dtic.mil/indices/2001system/oliver.html. 
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of a deterrent to the government to abandon outdated technology.  In the long run, the 
PBL ideology should be cheaper, however if technology continues to move at the current 
rate, despite the best intentions, the contract will start to increase in cost to the contractor, 
thereby decreasing his bottom line.  
• The American Taxpayer-Another issue is the increasing demand from 
constituents to decrease cost, specifically in relation to defense spending. The long-term 
success of this plan seems to be based on the idea that DOD will continue to buy new 
weapon systems to replace those that no longer meet the needs of the future military. If 
the government and contractor maintain a solid working relationship, then the key 
obstacle will be convincing Congress to spend more money on new weapons systems.   
However, historically, changes in the presidential administration as well as changes in the 
power of the Congressional political party have a significant impact on the life-cycle 
funding of such programs.  
• Realistic Contractor Capability-Finally, there is the issue of a contractor’s 
capability of meeting the same, or improving upon, delivery dates. Most contractors 
“quietly” agree that they cannot successfully meet operational tempo demands during 
contingencies.  This fallacy has led some members to suggest that incentives for 
contractors be tied directly to weapon system readiness levels.  Unfortunately, Readiness 
levels have many other variables that impact the aggregate metric. Some of these include 
human resources, training, operational tempo, world events, and the specific mission of 
the weapon system.  In reality, there are too many variables to hang a contractor’s profit 
solely on meeting a metric that in many cases may be unrealistic and unattainable.  
E. THE CONTRACT  
“The development of a successful partnership and service level agreement 
requires a balance of power and incentive to make it work.”48 The results of such an 
agreement can be surprising because of the synergies and increased level of creativity 
that directly fuels the level of accomplishment.  Contracting officers are offered a variety 
of mechanisms to protect the government and reward the contractor.  Specifically noted 
                                                 
48 D. Oliver, Performance Based Logistics Program Brief, June 4, 2001. Retrieved August 21, 2005 
from www.dtic.mil/indices/2001system/oliver.html p. 2. 
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options include fixed- price or cost-reimbursable contracts that contain award fees, 
graduated award fees, award terms, fixed fees, fixed terms, and in many cases a 
combination of various profit based awards. Typically, using either a cost-reimbursable 
or fixed- price contract with any of the abovementioned options is based on how the 
government wants to measure contractor performance. Success or failure is often defined 
in an evaluation period and focuses on general procedures to determine if the award fee 
has been earned.  
If the objective is to measure specifically designated performance categories, 
criteria, or performance over an indicated evaluation period, then a simple award fee may 
suffice. The benefit is that this element has flexible revision and change options that can 
be distributed to individual workers as bonuses, thereby making them more personal to 
those actually performing on the contract. The disadvantage is that it requires a “constant 
review of the statement of work and an additional investment of time in administration 
due to the consistent need to for performance documentation.49  Additionally there is the 
ongoing need to focus on end-item performance and successfully striking a perfect 
balance between cost, schedule and actual task performed.50  
Using a cost or fixed-price contract in conjunction with a graduated award fee has 
a somewhat different effect. This contract type has what is considered competing areas of 
focus within the program. Specifically noted are areas where ‘macro levels of overriding’ 
performance is required. It has a strong focus on cost as an independent variable (CAIV) 
and is a heavily milestone- focused vice, having all profit and fee based solely on 
performance. In essence, the primary focus of this contract is tradeoffs.51  "One noted 
weakness in using this type of incentive is the drain on resources that are required to  
 
 
                                                 
49 Performance Based Logistics. “Contracting and Performance Agreement Management for PBL. 
University of Alabama Center for Science & Technology.  
50 D. Oliver, Performance Based Logistics Program Brief, June 4, 2001. Retrieved August 21, 2005 
from www.dtic.mil/indices/2001system/oliver.html p. 13. 
51 D. Oliver, Performance Based Logistics Program Brief, June 4, 2001. Retrieved August 21, 2005 
from www.dtic.mil/indices/2001system/oliver.html p. 13. 
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manage this type of contract.  Additionally, the impact on award-fee incentives can be 
magnified negatively if the government uses the incorrect higher-level performance 
element."52  
Performance-Based Incentives work in “measurable, mission related terms that 
include performance standards, quality assurance plans and financial incentives/penalties 
based on performance.  It is suggested that this type of contract incentive be applies 
selectively to discourage inefficiencies and to motivate contractor efforts that might not 
otherwise be emphasized.”53 Benefits include the fact that profit is tied to specific 
technical performance objectives, delivery schedule, and cost control objectives. Once 
again, the weakness is the increase in resources that are required for oversight, and delays 
in any area would directly impact contractor profit.  
F. CONTRACT PROBLEMS/ ISSUES 
• Oversight Requirement- The primary issue with the contract for 
performance-based logistics is that it is based on performance.  Therefore, regardless of 
the type of contract used, all will require oversight by the contracting officer that ranges 
from micro to the macro level. The limited number of personnel available and the 
magnitude of visibility required often results in some of the similar concerns raised in the 
Engagement vs. Disengagement paper written by Professor Cory Yoder, Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The government has been given a tool that has the sole intent of 
effectively reducing the personnel requirements and overall system cost as well as 
simplifying the supportability requirements for a variety of weapons systems.  
Contradicting the potential for success is the increase in requirement for extensive 
oversight by the government to ensure that incentive and award fees are actually awarded 
within the scope of the contract.   
Solutions  
• Option 1 -Raise the stakes for contractor performance and lower the 
incentive fee.  If the relationship is the most important portion of a contract, and 
                                                 
52 D. Oliver, Performance Based Logistics Program Brief, June 4, 2001. Retrieved August 21, 2005 
from www.dtic.mil/indices/2001system/oliver.html p. 13. 
53 Ibid. 
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according to the studies at the University of Alabama, the contract only becomes a 
concern when the there is a disagreement, then this is a viable option.  Additionally, Mr. 
Steve Bernard, Logistics Manager at NAVAIR, stated that the contractor makes money 
on spares, not the developing of weapon systems.  Therefore, simply lower the award fee 
while strategically maintaining a balance between what the government is willing to pay 
and the area on the scale where the contractor believes that he is still benefiting from the 
agreement.  Incidentally, the more prevalent a method becomes, the more proficient a 
contractor becomes at implementing that methodology.  PBL costs for overall support 
should decrease after a contractor, his suppliers, and other infrastructure are in place. This 
efficiency should especially be realized when a contractor supports 4 or 5 weapon 
systems using this contracting strategy.  
• Option 2 - Make the contract type FFP from the beginning vice the cost 
plus for contractors who have had prior major performance-based logistics contracts, 
while maintaining the current award fee structure. Experience significantly reduces the 
initial start-up costs for major contractors. Typically they have a better understanding of 
the scope of contract requirements and can execute a contract much faster than a 
contractor who is starting from scratch (e.g., KBR in LOGCAP contracts).   
• Options 3 - Design software that is similar to EVMS that tracks the entire 
cost of a PBL contract. The program parameters should start with the initial C-17 PBL 
contracts and move forward to include the current V-22 contract. Use this information to 
track the actual cost, including the award and incentive fees paid to contractors. Later use 
the data to determine if past prices been fair and reasonable and if experienced 
contractors are adequately capturing realistic cost in the initial negotiation of the contract, 
or is the contractor simply taking advantage of the government’s need and choosing to 
meet that need at a cost that is disproportionately above the “Actual?” If this is the case, 
then the government should seek some form of resolution, including re-opening 
negotiations and/or contract termination.   
G. RECOMMENDATION FOR CONTRACT EXECUTION 
This analysis suggests a gradual implementation of all options, beginning with the 
development of the software and ending with the implementation of FFP type contracts 
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for commercial entities that have had at least two past PBL contracts. Most companies 
maintain lessons learned on past execution, expect to receive additional government 
business, and in many cases, immediately correct deficiencies to improve profit. 
Contracts would typically be awarded via competition versus sole source in order to take 
advantage of the market opportunities and to raise the stakes for contractors. Contract 
visibility should include higher levels of oversight so that key players can monitor the 
contractor’s success at meeting the requirements. If the user and congressional staffers 
are aware of the requirements, then contractor performance will be monitored by two key 
but diverse elements that are capable of influencing profit.  
H. SUMMARY  
PBL represents the transition in focus from the contract to the relationship 
between the customer and the contractor. It is no longer the “strength of the contract,” but 
the strength of the relationship that drives the success of war-fighter support. In a 
combined effort to keep a weapon system operating at its highest level of reliability, 
many contractor options for engineering changes, requirement modifications, and 
authority are granted in the original contract. However, the significant decrease in 
personnel, defense spending, and diversity in operational requirements threatens the 




Table 3.   Comparison of Culture Examples54   
 
                                                 
54 From Performance Based Logistics. “Contracting and Performance Agreement) Management for 
PBL. University of Alabama Center for Science & Technology.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Marine’s experimental tiltrotor squadron completed more than a 
month of simulated combat mission in California and Nevada and has 
returned to North Carolina for a crucial set of operations at sea. The 
operations at sea will involve multiple aircraft flying on and off 
amphibious assault ships. The squadron of eight aircraft flew more than 
600 hours during the rigorous trials which were designed to duplicate the 
demanding Afghanistan and Iraqi mountain and desert conditions where 
Marine helicopters are currently in operation. Current simulated 
operations included combat assault missions with troop insertion.  The last 
time Osprey demonstrated troop transport was in April 2000 when the 
MV-22 crashed at Mirana, Arizona killing 19 Marines. This crash and the 
crash in North Carolina eight months later killing four Marines prompted 
an 18 month grounding of the aircraft.55 
The new requirements are not so much the issue, as downsizing, transformation, 
and “jointness,” are all necessary, whether combined or independent of one another. 
However, execution in lieu of so many technology gaps and the increasing world demand 
on the U.S. military has almost created a drag effect on the military’s ability to support 
demand. The concern is not that all mandates for new technology, jointness and 
transformation will be unsuccessful, because the U.S. military historically achieves 
success even in perceived failure. However, the trickle effect at the operational level has 
left many gaps that will widen, not close, as the operational tempo continues to rise.  
The Osprey has recently been approved for full rate production. The successful 
fielding of this new technology still has many obstacles to overcome. Included in this 
struggle is the ongoing desire for balance in spending and contractor profit. The results 
often tip in favor of the contractor when the government’s decisions appear to support 
what the public perceives as contractor cash cows. These results occasionally happen 
despite the best efforts of negotiators.  
Transformation or change is not only required, but necessary, and the future 
success of the Osprey, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the Performance-Based Logistics 
                                                 
55 NAVAIR, V-22 Osprey Web. “ Tilt-Rotor Osprey Faces Crucial Test at Sea After Rigorous Land 
Trials” Retrieved July 6,,2005 from 
http://pma275.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.detail&news_id=116. 
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strategy, as does everything else, lies gently in the hands of the local user, engineer, 
program manager, congressman and taxpayer. Strangely enough, this is a group as 
diverse as the stars.  
A. OPTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Option 1 - Numerical Cost Analysis of actual long term cost savings with 
performance based contracts versus traditional contracts that are supported by the 
government.  
Option 2 - Five year capabilities review of the Osprey. Did it actually accomplish 
its initial goals and if so was it a higher price than originally forecasted.  
Option 3 - Complete a 7 year analysis determining Osprey’s impact on current 
and future war-fighting capabilities of future conflicts 
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